Assessing the monetary relevance of land value capture: the case for charges for additional building rights in São Paulo, Brazil by Smolka, Martim Oscar & Maleronka, Camila
  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE AND LAND PLANNING  
VOL.1 (2018) 
eISSN  2623-4807 
Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/reland 
 
 
 
© 2018 by Author(s).  This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International (CC BY 4.0). See https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
Assessing the monetary relevance of land value capture: the case for 
charges for additional building rights in São Paulo, Brazil 
Martim Oscar Smolkaa, Camila Maleronkab 
aLincoln Institute of Land Policy, 113 Brattle St., Cambridge, MA 02138-3400, USA 
bP3urb, Rua Ernest Friedrich Jost, 40, São Paulo, 05429-070, Brazil 
 
Abstract 
Land value capture (LVC) provides a mechanism for communities to recover financial windfalls accruing to 
landowners from public investments in infrastructure and services or from beneficial changes in land use norms and 
regulations. This progressive public financing option is gaining noteworthy traction in nations worldwide.  
This article argues that a major new value capture tool—charges for building rights—can be a significant source of 
public revenue. This type of fee has the advantage not only of generating much-needed financing for urban 
infrastructure and services, but also of addressing a fundamental social equity issue in land policy. After briefly 
explaining the argument for value capture, the article describes the groundbreaking implementation of building 
rights charges in São Paulo, Brazil, with specific examples of how those charges are calculated. Also described is the 
successful use of Certificates of Additional Building Potential (CEPACs) an innovative tool to collect land value 
increments resulting from large-scale urban redevelopment projects. The article then recommends several changes 
that would help to maximize the revenues from building rights charges and promote more equitable urban 
development.   
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1. Introduction: why land value capture? 
Conventional fiscal policies largely neglect the fact that the costs of providing adequate transportation, water and 
sewage systems, and open space services to meet more intensive land use are borne by all taxpayers, but their 
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benefits accrue only to certain property owners. Charges on the land value increments that these landowners receive 
from public actions—such as conversion of land from rural to urban use or changes to zoning regulations that allow 
higher-density development—fall under the legal principle that no one is entitled to unjustly earned income. 
And under the equity principle that the public sector cannot favor one citizen over another, public investments and 
regulations affecting land values must be uniform across a city. If they are not, the government must take measures 
to redistribute the benefits and burdens of those investments and regulations. A long history of international 
experience demonstrates that it is both feasible and practical to defray at least part of the cost of urbanization by 
capturing the land value increment created in the process (Hagman and Misczynski, 1978; Smolka and Furtado, 2001; 
Peterson, 2009; Muñoz Gielen, 2010; Alterman, 2012; Ingram and Hong, 2012; Walters, 2012; Smolka, 2013). 
2. Charges for building rights in São Paulo  
The instrument that regulates charges for additional building rights in Brazil (Outorga Onerosa do Direito de 
Construir, OODC) is based on the notion that the landowner’s property right is limited to a basic floor area ratio (FAR) 
that differs from the maximum FAR the area could support. The right to build at a density up to the basic FAR is free, 
but developers wanting to build at a higher density than the FAR established by zoning law for a particular area must 
pay compensation to the city. The OODC is defined by the City Statute (Brazilian Land Development Act), the national 
law approved in 2001, that sets the guidelines for urban policy. The charge for building rights is not considered a 
tribute or a fee. The air rights above the basic FAR are also considered a public asset, which the city can concede 
(against payment or not) for urbanistic purposes, according to urban development guidelines.  
Although many other municipalities in Brazil are currently implementing the OODC, São Paulo is the only one that 
has managed to set citywide standards. São Paulo initially approved two basic FARs that were in line with preexisting 
zoning law: in zones where the maximum FARs were higher, the basic FAR was set at 2.0; in lower-density zones, the 
basic FAR was set at 1.0. In the same negotiation package, preexisting maximum FARs were incremented to entice 
developers to the new regime (Maleronka and Furtado, 2013).   
After a long transition toward a more consistent system, the City of São Paulo instituted in 2014 a universal basic 
FAR of 1.0 as the building right that applied to all landowners. The maximum FAR ranges from 1.0 to 4.0 according 
to zoning. The difference between the basic FAR and the maximum FAR therefore equates to the building rights that 
must be acquired from the public.  
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3. Calculating the value of building rights 
While several formulas have been used to calculate the land value increment resulting from the OODC, they all have 
limited accuracy. In theory, the value of land developed with a FAR of 2.0 compared with a basic FAR of 1.0 should 
be the difference between the residual values of their respective highest and best uses. In practice, the calculation 
is much more complex because no two buildings in an area are the same and changes in some plots affect the highest 
and best use of nearby plots. 
The prevailing method, the so-called virtual plot method, only partially addresses these complications. Under this 
calculation, a developer interested in a building a 500 m2 structure in a zone where the basic FAR is 1.0 and the 
maximum is 2.0 could acquire a plot of 500 m2 or a plot of 250 m2 and acquire building rights to construct the 
additional 250 m2 on that plot. For this additional area, the developer would pay the equivalent of one more plot of 
land with a FAR of 1 in the same area zoned for a maximum FAR of 2.0. 
 
 
Figure 1. Virtual plot logic.  
Source: the authors. 
 
Since 2002, over 2,500 high-rise licensed projects in Sao Paulo acquired additional building rights, raising over US$1 
billion in public revenues. To get a sense of the revenues to be generated from particular projects, consider the 
following examples.  
 
3.1. Examples of OODC projects 
The first example is a corporate development, located at Paulista Avenue, one of the city high-end icons. This 11 
floor building produced one of the individual largest land value increment collected under the OODC: it paid around 
  
REAL ESTATE AND LAND PLANNING 2018  
Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/reland 
 
 
 
127 
 
US$1,800 per additional m2, or a total of US$5.7 million for the additional 3,118 m2 for an increased basic FAR from  
2.0 to 2.96. 
The formula approved in 2002 used to calculate the OODC (that is, before the universal unitary basic FAR was 
instituted) was as follows: 
C = V / basic FAR * Fp * Fs * (intended FAR – basic FAR) * plot area     (1) 
where: 
C: Compensation 
V: Assessed value of land for property taxation 
Fp: Planning factor (varies from 0.25 to 1.20 depending on project location) 
Fs: Social interest factor (varies from 0 to 1 depending on project use)      
For the case at hand, the virtual plot benchmark value was US$3,334.60; the planning factor was 1.1; the social 
interest factor was 1.0; the intended FAR was 2.96), and the plot area was 3,237.01 m2. Therefore, the formula 
applied was: 
C (US$ 5,699.30) = 3,334,60 / 2.0 * 1.1 * 1.0 (2.96 – 2.0) * 3,237.01     (2) 
Although it is unknown how much the developer actually paid for the plot, municipal sales tax records suggest a 
market value of about US$10.1 million at the time. This means the land value increment calculated for the additional 
building rights represents close to full recovery. Thus, for twice the plot area of building rights, the developer would 
have paid something around US$10.1 million (US$5.05 million x 2), but to build just under one additional time (0.96), 
the compensation was US$5.7 million.  
 
 
  
REAL ESTATE AND LAND PLANNING 2018  
Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/reland 
 
 
 
128 
 
Figure 2. US$10.1 million OODC commercial development 
Source: stan.com.br. 
A more typical building project in Sao Paulo is a residential development on a 2,000 m2 plot, with a basic FAR of 1.0 
and a maximum FAR at 2.0. The developer acquired the full maximum building rights available, for an assessed virtual 
plot value of US$598.19 per m2; a planning factor of 0.7, and a social interest factor of 1.0. The compensation for 
the additional 2,000 m2 of building area was US$837,468, or US$419 per m2. Note that the redistributive power of 
these building charges is considerable—the 20 additional high-income apartments (assuming 100 m2 per apartment) 
would fully subsidize 25 social housing units. 
It is also important to note that the compensation calculated here is well below the proxy market value from sales 
taxes quotes in the area at US$4.45 million, or US$2,225 per m2. The discrepancy reflects the difficulty of obtaining 
a virtual plot value, that is, the value of a plot that reflects its use at a FAR of 1.0 when all plots in the  zone has a 
maximum FAR of 2.0. Furthermore, if the planning factor was neutral, that is were not set at 0.7, the compensation 
due would have been US$1,196,382.86. This is yet one of the many adjustments needed to a system still transitioning 
between regimes affecting land values and uses. 
 
Figure 3. US$837,468 OODC residential development 
 Source: gafisa.com.br 
 
3.2 The São Paulo experience with CEPACs 
Brazil’s Certificates of Additional Building Potential (CEPACs) provide an ingenious solution for valuing additional 
building rights by basing the charges on the amount that developers are willing to pay in a competitive market. These 
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bonds are issued by the municipality, regulated by the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM, the Brazilian 
equivalent of the US Securities and Exchange Commission), and sold by electronic auction on the São Paulo Stock 
Exchange Market. CEPACs were created in 1995,  sanctioned by the City Statute of 2001, and first implemented in 
2004.   
CEPACs are used in urban operations (UO), which are delimited urban areas (polygons) subjected to zoning 
redefinition (for land use and density) and supported by improved urban infrastructure. UOs involve large-scale 
areas (typically over 500 hectares) and have building rights over and above the restrictions imposed by the master 
plan or zoning ordinances. All revenues resulting from the sale of these building rights revert to the UO to be invested 
in urban infrastructure but also in social housing. There are currently four urban operations in progress in Sao Paulo, 
and just two of them have collected about US$2.7 billion in revenues over 10-year development periods. 
Each urban operation issues its own CEPACs and conversion table of m2 equivalences for each zone within the UO. 
This adjustment is necessary because each CEPAC provides the right to build one additional m2 according to the 
zoning plan for that particular zone. For example, one CEPAC might be worth only 0.8 m2 closer to a main avenue, 
but 1.2 m2 in less desirable areas.   
CEPACs offer some noteworthy advantages. First, they address the difficult issue of assessing the market value of 
the land price increment resulting from UOs, and they reduce the transaction costs involved in negotiating the 
impacts of the project on individual properties. In addition, CEPAC auctions help local administrations anticipate the 
funds they need to invest in infrastructure and services in the redevelopment project. Furthermore, selling CEPACs 
in tranches makes it possible to monitor and finely calibrate the market. The fact that the funds are earmarked 
reinforces developers’ confidence in the system and prevents legal appeals.  
Auctions of CEPACs may be public (to acquire development rights) or private (as a currency with which to pay 
contractors). The face value of a new offering of CEPACs starts with the value from the previous auction. In the seven 
auctions for the Faria Lima UO, for example, the offered value started at US$550 in 2004 and ended at US$2,100 in 
2010. The US$2.7 billion raised by the two UOs enabled São Paulo to defray US$150 million of the costs for the new 
Ouro metro line, and supported construction of an iconic bridge that cost over US$100 million. Some US$57 million 
of the CEPAC funds were also used to redevelop in situ Jardim Edith, a slum area located in one of the most expensive 
areas of the city.  
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3. Example of a CEPAC project  
The site of a former bicycle factory, with an area of 80,000 m2, was sold for US$145 million in 2010 for conversion 
to a mixed-use development. In November 2014, the developer presented 246,076 CEPACs to the municipality to 
add three times the plot area of building rights. The CEPACs were acquired at auction for US$120 million. Thus, 
assuming a FAR of 1.0 for the whole area, the land component of the cost would have been US$1,812.50 per m2. 
The additional 264,076 m2 of land (i.e., of building rights) were acquired at US$487 per m2. The difference can be 
explained by the non-computable areas (for garages, balconies and terraces, playgrounds, and the like), possible 
favorable auctioning conditions (i.e., no higher bids to compete with), and likely other externalities that may have 
affected the price (e.g., a planned transit station). Unlike the original sales price of US$145 million, the CEPAC values 
thus reflect the overall conditions in the UO area where the project was sited.  
 
Figure 4. US$120 million CEPAC mixed-use development. 
 Source: orealizacoes.com.br 
Were it not for these building rights charges, a significant share—if not all—of the land value increment obtained 
from these additional rights would have gone to the original landowner. 
 
4. Potential revenue from OODC 
Revenues from the OODC have fallen short of their potential for several reasons. As already noted, a citywide basic 
FAR was not set before 2014 and cadaster values used to benchmark the charges are known to vary as much as 30 
percent from the full market value. Discounting factors applied for certain structures (e.g., environmentally 
sustainable buildings) and exemptions for social housing and other non-computable areas of high-rise buildings 
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further reduce potential net collections from public sales of building rights. Clearly, citywide adherence to the basic 
FAR of 1.0, improvements to value maps, and changes to discounting factors are in order. 
For example, developers in the City of São Paulo launch an average of 30,000 multifamily housing units per year, 
amounting to US$5.95 billion in sales. Based on the calculations provided above, a conservative estimate of OODC—
assuming land value accounts for about 18 percent of the sales price, and one-third of its value accounting for the 
OODC—additional building rights charges would have been about US$360 million per year. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Real estate units launched and total sales prices in São Paulo 
Source: secovi.com.br 
A host of other factors also can reduce a FAR of 6.0 or more (for a building with 24–26 floors and occupying 25 
percent of the plot) to the average FAR of 2.5 used in the city. In effect, an incentive to build residential projects, 
created in 1979, known as Adiron’s formula, was still in place for most of the 2004–2017 period, adding up to one 
free FAR for vertical residential developments by reducing the occupancy rate. Thus, with an occupancy rate of 0.5 
and basic FAR of 1.0, one can reach the basic FAR of 2.0 (at no charge) when the occupancy rate is reduced to 0.25. 
In 2014, this incentive was eliminated. Moreover, the non-computable portion of a project could rightfully be 
reduced to 25 percent from the current 59 percent. All in all, these adjustments would have brought the public 
revenues from additional building rights to well over US$1.0 billion per year. 
Adding to these potential revenues from building rights charges from individual plots, the auctioning of CEPACs 
results in average proceeds about US$250 million per year—about half the amount that this city of 11 million 
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inhabitants collects in property taxes. Most important, these additional revenues would practically double the 
overall  investment capacity of Sao Paulo.  
 5. Conclusion 
Value capture policies and tools are undeniably gaining acceptability around the world. But assessing land value 
increments from public administrative actions is still a challenge for many jurisdictions. The São Paulo experience 
illustrates more than one way to make these valuations, and although imperfect, demonstrates that it is feasible to 
charge for building rights. The fees generate much-needed financing for urban infrastructure and social housing, 
while also imposing a fairer distribution of the costs and benefits of urbanization.  
São Paulo’s charges for additional building rights paid by individual projects or through the auctioning of building 
rights through CEPACs for large redevelopment areas show that the potential payoffs are indeed substantial. 
Improvement of data sources and their management to more accurately estimate virtual plot benchmarks  values,  
and elimination of unjustified discounts, with the growing sophistication of property developers’ practices, would 
result in greater accuracy and higher revenues from implementing value capture tools in Sao Paulo and other 
municipalities. 
6. References 
Alterman, R., (2012) ‘Land use regulations and property values: The “windfalls capture” idea revisited’ in Brooks, N., Donaghy, 
K., Knaap, G. J., (ed.) Handbook of urban economics and planning, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
Furtado, F., Rezende, V. F., Oliveira, T. C., Jorgensen, P., (2010) Sale of building rights: Overview and evaluation of municipal 
experiences [Online]. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Available at: 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/working-papers/sale-building-rights (Accessed: 30 May 2018). 
Hagman, D. G., Misczynski, D. J., (ed.), (1978) Windfalls for wipeouts: Land value recapture and compensation. Chicago, IL: 
American Society of Planning Officials.  
Ingram, G. K., Hong, Y. H., (ed.) (2012) Value capture and land policies. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.  
Maleronka, C., Furtado, F. (2013) ‘A Outorga Onerosa do Direito de Construir (OODC). A Experiência de São Paulo na Gestão 
Pública de Aproveitamentos Urbanísticos [Online]. Avaiable at: 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/maleronka-wp14cm1po-full_0.pdf (Accessed 28 April 2018). 
Muñoz Gielen, D., (2010) Capturing value increase in urban redevelopment: A study of how the economic value increase in 
urban redevelopment can be used to finance the necessary public infrastructure and other facilities. Lieden, The Netherlands: 
Sidestone Press.  
  
REAL ESTATE AND LAND PLANNING 2018  
Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/reland 
 
 
 
133 
 
Peterson, G. E., (2009) Unlocking land values to finance urban infrastructure. Washington, DC: World Bank and Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF). 
Secovi (2018) Anuário 2017 [Online]. Available at: http://www.secovi.com.br/downloads/url/2289 (Accessed 28 April 2018). 
Smolka, M. O. (2013) Implementing Value Capture in Latin America: Policy and Tools for Urban Development, Policy Focus 
Report, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, June. 
Smolka, M. O., Amborski, D. (2007) Value capture for urban development: An inter-American comparison [Online]. Working 
Paper. Cambridge, USA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Available at: https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/working-
papers/value-capture-urban-development?pubid=1279 (Accessed: 30 May 2018). 
Smolka, M. O., Furtado, F. (2001) Recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina: Alternativas para el desarrollo urbano. 
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Walters, L. C., (2012) Land value capture in policy and practice. Salt Lake City, Utah. Romney Institute, Brigham Young 
University.  
 
